Sunday, September 30, 2007

Anyone

who is not following the National League today does not like baseball. Personally, I'm rooting for the Phillies and Rockies, but really a four way tie would be the best.

Friday, September 28, 2007

If Sterling and Waldman were Sox announcers (god forbid)

Sterling: The Reeddd Sooxxxxxxx Wiin! Thhheeeeeeeeee Reedd Sooxxx Wiinnnnnn! The Red Sox are division champs!

Waldman: [orgasms, dies, keeps screaming]

Crazy

A lot of people complain about the competitive balance of baseball, and the fact that the same teams seem to make the playoffs every year. If, out of the current five team scramble for three playoff spots in the NL the Rockies, Phillies, and Diamondbacks prove victorious--and that is certainly a distinct possibility--then there will only be ONE team that made the playoffs this year that also made them last year. That is an insane degree of turnover.

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Please, no

From mlb.com:

If Clemens is unable to pitch, Matt DeSalvo or Kei Igawa could fill in.

Monday, September 24, 2007

The quotable Griffey

Ken Griffey Jr. on his injury:

"The best way I can describe it is it felt like somebody bungee-jumped off my right nut" (Cincinnati Post).

Sunday, September 23, 2007

Pitching the playoffs

The Red Sox are in the playoffs. But the ALDS will be tough for Boston--maybe more than the ALCS. That's because they will face either the Angels or the Indians, who pack respective 1-2 punches of Lackey-Escobar and Sabathia-Carmona, either of which outshines Beckett-Schilling/Matsuzaka/Buchholz. Who pitches for Boston?

The length of the ALDS will be seven or eight days, depending on whether Boston wins the division and whether it gets the best record in the AL.

Here's how I'd slot the rotation for a seven-day series:

Game 1: Buchholz
Game 2: Beckett
[offday]
Game 3: Schilling
Game 4: Matsuzaka
[offday]
Game 5: Beckett

Buchholz starts first so Beckett can pitch on normal rest and Buchholz can move into the bullpen, able to go in long relief for Dice-K in case the Japanese wonder has another shitty start. In turn, Matsuzaka would be in the bullpen in game one in case Buchholz falters. Schilling and, yes, even Matsuzaka should be superior to whoever's starting against them. The smart money would have the Sox taking game one or two and both three and four, leaving a fresh Beckett to start the ALCS.

Here's my rotation for an eight-day series, which would happen if Boston got the best record and elected for eight days or if Boston finished in the wild card and played the best-record team that elected for eight days:

Game 1: Beckett
[offday]
Game 2: Schilling
[offday]
Game 3: Matsuzaka
Game 4: Beckett
[offday]
Game 5: Schilling

Francona will probably use just this formula, using Buchholz as the lights-out guy in the bullpen. That makes a lot of sense. Buchholz could be extremely valuable in the pen, and the three offdays mean he could be used in four of five games. Francona would manage to respect Matsuzaka while minimizing Matsuzaka's playing time, because Matsuzaka would never get enough rest to pitch out of the bullpen and Buchholz could do long relief in game three in case Matsuzaka stinks. The key assumptions in this formula are that Buccholz is a talented unknown, requiring flexibility, and that Schilling is on his game. Those are sound assumptions.

Here's a ballsy alternative:

Game 1: Beckett
[offday]
Game 2: Buchholz
[offday]
Game 3: Schilling
Game 4: Beckett
[offday]
Game 5: Buchholz (or Matsuzaka)

As I said, ballsy--intending to start Buchholz twice, including in game five. Here's why it works: you still get Beckett twice, and if Buchholz falters in his game-two start, you know about it early and yank him for game five. Matsuzaka goes to the bullpen for games one and two. If Buccholz blows game one, Matsuzaka rests in games three and four and starts game five. Smart money has the Sox winning behind Schilling and taking two of four Beckett-Buchholz starts--but it's close. The key assumptions in this formula are that Buccholz is awesome and ready for prime-time, that Matsuzaka is comfortable with pitching out of the bullpen, and that Schilling isn't great. Problems are, Schilling has pitched great lately, and god knows if Dice-K can come from the pen. But uber-confidence in Buccholz, if justified, could overcome those problems, especially if the Sox feel they need something better than a 1-2 of Beckett-Schilling and are willing to gamble.

The big question is whether the Sox, if they finish with the best record in the AL, should choose a seven- or eight-day series. Francona would be a fool not to choose seven. The Sox don't want to face the Lackey-Escobar or Sabathia-Carmona pairs twice; although not probable, they could easily win three of four games. Despite the Sox strengthening their bullpen with Buccholz or Matsuzaka in the eight-day series, the Sox bullpen is already stronger than the Angels' or the Indians' and will benefit from gaining Tim Wakefield and Jon Lester in either scenario.

I'll leave the difficult task of Yankees' rotation to Blackadder, though he may wish to wait until we get a better read on Mussina, Kennedy and even Clemens. Personally, I'd bench Wang in favor of starting Kyle Farnsworth--not to mention bringing A-Rod to play catcher and moving Posada to center field.

Saturday, September 22, 2007

Record Breaker

Last year, Ryan Howard won the MVP with a monster offensive season, hitting 58 home runs and authoring a batting line of .313/.425/.659 (that's batting average/on base percentage/slugging percentage) Personally, I think Pujols was better, but Howard was really awesome. This year, Howard has 194 strikeouts, one away from tying the all time record in a single season. It seems almost certain that Howard will be the first person ever to strike out 200 times in a season.

Quite a falloff for Howard, huh? Um, not really. Last year he struck out 182 times, and this year his line before tonight's game was .265/.388/.569, which while not as good as last year is still one of the 10 best in the National League. Howard is a wonderful example of why you shouldn't look at strikeout totals to judge players; while strikeouts are worse than other types of outs, they are not that much worse, and they are much better than double plays. It is more than possible to be incredibly productive and strike out a lot; in fact, strikeouts correlate positively with most good measures of hitting productivity (although I am almost positive they correlate negatively with batting average.) Striking out a lot is often a sign of patience and willingness to work the count, while a low strikeout total is often (not always) an indication of an impatient hitter with a reasonably high batting average but few walks or home runs. There are, of course, some truly special hitters who manage to combine great power and a high walk rate with a low strikeout total, but there are never going to be many guys who are that special (Ruth and Gehrig, by the way, had very high strikeout totals relative to their time; if Ruth were playing today, he would likely set the career strikeout record.)

Oh yeah, and that A-Rod kid can play a little...

Thursday, September 20, 2007

Weird

So J.D. Drew hits a home run, and Papelbon allows a grand slam. I think we've entered the twilight zone.

Tuesday, September 18, 2007

Die Eric Gagne

That is the extent of my thoughts.

Hype

So I know I shouldn't let this sort of thing bother me, but it does. Every year mlb.com gives out the Hank Aaron award, ostensibly to the best hitter in each league. The problem is that the award is determined by fan vote, with the result that fame and popularity play an even bigger role than they do in BBWAA voting. Case in point, the American League winner last year was Derek Jeter; while I think Jeter was robbed of the MVP, I don't see how anyone could think he was a better hitter, than, say Travis Hafner.

This year, the voting has been narrowed down to five, and there is some major silliness. The worst is that Barry Bonds, who in case anyone forgot PASSED HANK AARON FOR THE ALL-TIME RECORD IN HOME RUNS THIS YEAR, and is currently posting the highest OBP for anyone other than himself since Mickey Mantle in 1962, was not deemed deserving of the HANK AARON award by sufficiently many fans to warrant a place in the top 5. Jose Reyes, who everybody likes because he smiles a lot and runs really fast, is on the list, despite the fact that he is a barely above average hitter. Yes, I know he is a very good hitter for a shortstop, so his VORP is very high; but that sort of consideration is relevant to MVP voting, which attempts to account for total value. The Hank Aaron award is supposed to be for the best hitter. Right now, the best hitter--who also happens to be one of the three best hitters ever, and at his peak was probably better than anyone ever--is not on the ballot. The fans should be ashamed.

Monday, September 17, 2007

Liveblogging the Yanks game

The Yankees are playing a day game against the Jays, meaning we'll be at work, meaning we can devote our full attention to baseball.

Jack, 1:33 pm: 3-0 Jays! But the joy of the Jays lead is nearly erased by the fact that Susan Waldman, cunt extraordinaire, is back on the radio. I mean "cunt extraordinaire" in a descriptive sense. She must have an extraordinary cunt to have so many shrieking orgasms every time any Yankee does anything good.

Red Sox sweep*

*In an imagined world where Manny Ramirez was healthy and playing rather than benched, stoned and dreaming of ponies and cake.

In Friday's game, an amazing Yankees comeback was spoiled by an even more amazing Red Sox walk-off win. Manny Ramirez smacked a three-run home run clear over the Green Monster as the Sox took game one, 10-8. J.D. Drew left the game with a concussion.

Saturday was a Red Sox romp, as the Sox roughed up Chien-Ming Wang and the Yankees' bullpen for 15 runs, five driven in by Sox slugger Manny Ramirez. J.D. Drew left the game with tenderness in his brain.

Sunday saw another Manny-powered win. The game was tied 1-1 until the bottom of the fifth inning, when Manny Ramirez smacked a bases-loaded, bases-clearing triple to right-center field. Later Ramirez made a sensational defensive play, scaling the Green Monster to rob Derek Jeter of a three-run homer. The Red Sox won 5-1. J.D. Drew left the game with encephalitis, leading doctors to find a career-ending series of tumors.

Sunday, September 16, 2007

Rubber Game

Well, this is not the best pitching matchup of the series, but it may have the best story: Clemens, arguably the greatest pitcher in baseball history, the prodigal son of the Red Sox trying to secure his legacy as a Yankee in probably his last season; and Schilling, adoped favorite, owner of the most famous red sock in history and self-proclaimed Yankee killer. The last time these guys met, it was a doozy.

Here's hoping this isn't the last time this year these teams play each other.

Fausto Carmona...

now leads the AL in ERA. He's sort of the opposite of Yorman Bazardo; probably the coolest name in baseball.

Why Andy MacPhail is wrong

Note: This article contains some math: nothing heavy-duty, indeed stuff that probably many college-educated readers have seen at some point in their life, but may well have forgotten. I know this may alienate some readers, but unfortunately I don't see any way of getting to the conclusions I want without it. If you don't understand the math at one point, you will have to just trust me that the conclusions I draw really do follow from the premises.

I was watching an Orioles-Red Sox game last week--a good game, a pitching duel between Jeremy Guthrie and Josh Beckett--when Andy MacPhail, the COO of the Orioles, came on. When asked what he would do to remedy yet another disappointing season, he emphasized that he would focus heavily on improving the Orioles' pitching. MacPhail could not resist appealing to a number of hoary old chestnuts, such as that "pitching is 75% percent of the game" and other such nonsense; but it still seems like he has a good point. After all, the Orioles offense is bad, but not outrageously so. Their pitching, despite the presence of arguably the most dominant pitcher in the AL this year (Bedard), has been abysmal; they are second only to the incomparable Tampa Bay Devil Rays in runs allowed per game.

While plausible, is there any way of testing MacPhail's contention? After all, even though their offense is not in the sorry state of their pitching, the Orioles would certainly be helped by improved hitting. Is there some way of telling whether they should be focusing on their hitting or their defense (overall defense, e.g. pitching and fielding)? Baseball Prospectus' book Baseball Between the Numbers looks at this question in one chapter, and although it is good the chapter is, ironically, more historical and anecdotal. I want to take a more technical look at the question.
My starting point is one of the best formulas of sabermetrics, Bill James' pythagorean winning percentage. What this formula says is that, if RS is the number of runs a team scores and RA is the number of runs a team allows, their pythagorean winning percentage is RS^2/(RS^2+RA^2) (the name comes from the exponent "2" reminding James of the Pythagorean formula in Euclidean Geometry; other exponents are actually more accurate, but this does not affect the analysis.) With some notable exceptions, this formula usually predicts a teams actual wins to withing about 3 games, and the prediction is even more accurate when several seasons are considered. It also, during the season, a better predictor of future performance than past record (a fact which the Yankees and the Mariners have exemplified this year, in opposite ways.) As such, the pythagorean winning percentage is sometimes considered a better reflection of a teams "true talent" than their actual winning percentage (the interested reader can consult this article by a math professor at Brown for a derivation of the formula under reasonable assumptions about run distributions.)
To simplify notation, we will use x instead of RS, y instead of RA, and write P(x,y)=x^2/(x^2+y^2) for the pythagorean winning percentage. The goal of teams front office should be to make P(x,y) as big as possible, i.e. to win as many games as possible (actually, this is not quite right; we will discuss a complication a little later.) Thus, the question of whether to focus on hitting or fielding becomes: does P(x,y) increase more when x increases or when y decreases? Ideally, we would look at this question by looking at the marginal benefit of scoring one more run compared to allowing one less, i.e. we would compare P(x+1,y)-P(x,y) with P(x,y)-P(x,y-1). Unfortunately, these expressions are ugly. Instead, we will note that, even though as a matter of fact x and y are always positive inegers, the formula P(x,y) still makes sense if they are arbitrary real numbers. Thus instead of considering the marginal benefit P(x+1,y)-P(x,y) we instead look at the partial derivate Px(x,y) of P with respect to x, and similarly we consider -Py(x,y), the partial derivate with respect to y, in lieu of P(x,y)-P(x,y-1).
These derivates are trivial to compute, but I don't want to clutter this post with more symbols. After computing them, one looks at the ratio -Py(x,y)/Px(x,y); then improving defense is more valuable than improving hitting if and only if this ratio is bigger than 1. After a little algebra, one can compute that
-Py(x,y)/Px(x,y)=x/y
In other words, the ratio of the benefit to improving offense to the benefit to improving defense is equal to the ratio between runs scored and runs allowed! This is a conclusion that, to the best of my knowledge, has not appeared before. It has immediate applications to the problem at hand: one would expect a team to score more runs than it allows if and only if it is an above average team, i.e. has a record over .500. Thus, good teams should focus on improving their pitching, while bad teams should focus on their hitting. Furthermore, the better you are, the larger the ratio x/y presumably is, and therefore the larger the relative benefit to improving defense compared to offense; the inverse point holds for bad teams. This is a surprising result: it says, for instance, the Red Sox should be focusing more than any other team this offseason on improving their pitching, while the Devil Rays should be focusing primarily on improving their hitting.

There are a few other things worth pointing out. First, as already mentioned, the exponent "2" was irrelevant to the computation; a reader who knows calculus can convince him or herself that in fact the same ratio holds irrespective of the exponent. Furthermore, it has been shown that similar formulas work pretty well in other sports, like baseketball and hockey, albeit with slightly different exponents. Thus, the conclusion of this post--good teams should focus on defense, bad teams on offense--is true for many other sports as well.

So, was MacPhail wrong? Probably; there are still complications. For instance, it may be the case that, even though improving hitting would benefit the O's more than improving pitching, it is cheaper to improve pitching, so the marginal benefit to the team's bottom line. However, a) I doubt that that this is true, given how expensive pitching is, and b) I don't think MacPhail would admit on public television that he was sacrificing the success of the team to maximize profits. Of course, the Orioles won't ever contend with pitching this bad (although if Bedard and Guthrie and keep it up and Mazzone can teach Cabrera to control himself, they would have a pretty nice 1-3); but at the moment, of bigger concern to MacPhail should be the fact that no one on the team has as many as 20 home runs.


Saturday, September 15, 2007

God, sports writers can be stupid

Don't you think Buster Olney regrets
this? (you need a subscription to read the whole thing, but you can really get the point from the first few paragraphs).

Boy, They Aren't Kidding...

Read the headline to this. Then notice later on, Papelbon says "I can't remember a closer who ever went through a season without blowing a save. If you're a closer that goes through a season and doesn't blow a save, I'd like to meet you."

Um, Jon, hate to break it to you, but I suspect you've already met the guy.

Yorman Bazardo

That's all. Just pointing out the best name in baseball.

What I know about Bazardo:

1. He pitches for the Tigers.
2. He was probably beat up in middle school.

I mean, being named Bazardo is enough. But that wasn't enough for the parents. They named him Yorman, too.

Friday, September 14, 2007

Dice-K divided against himself

Five billion bucks that at least one headline of a Boston newspaper tomorrow morning reads "Dice-OK."

Tonight's outing against the Yankees summed up Daisuke's promise and problems alike. At times Matsuzaka seemed simply awesome, mixing pitches impressively and landing 95-mph fastballs with movement in the barely hittable part of the strike zone. But often he lost control, looking just plain sloppy. Usually Matsuzaka pitches well overall but loses control for one inning, bizarrely regaining composure the next inning. Tonight he presented his most succinct Jeckyll-Hyde act yet, going wild at the start of the fourth inning (double, triple and four-pitch walk, which almost understates how bad Daisuke looked) and suddenly finding himself at the end (strikeout and double play, deserved by quality pitches). He went on to dominate in the fifth and struggle in the sixth. Overall, I'd say he got lucky to give up two earned runs in 5.2 innings: he allowed four hits and five walks, though also struck out seven.

Yet Daisuke showed unambiguously why he has the stuff to be one of the best pitchers in baseball. He must learn to locate consistently. Given his high within-game, even within-inning, variance, his root problem might be mental.

The Yankees teeing off against Okajima and Papelbon will go unmentioned.

Thursday, September 13, 2007

Devils

As a Yankee fan, I am obliged to hate the Angels almost as much as I do the Red Sox; hence the title. They are, nevertheless, a fascinating team for so thoroughly bucking recent trends in baseball analysis.

In one sense, the answer to how the Angels are so good is easy: they score a lot of runs, and don't get scored on very much (it is misleading to say that they are 12'th in baseball in ERA, since that includes National League teams without the DH; more relevant is the fact that they are 5'th in the AL in RA per game.) Their divergence from their expected record, while real, is too small to warrant coming up with a special explanation.

Thus, the relevant question is how they manage to score so many and allow so few runs. The few runs allowed part is easy: they have some
excellent defensive players, two ace pitchers, and a solid bullpen, including a great closer (Ok, I'll stop with the links.)

Their offense, however, is more interesting. They score a lot of runs, despite displaying little power or patience at the plate. However, as Jack mentioned the Angels are still a respectable 5'th in OBP, in large part because of their very high .286 team batting average. The Angels have an extremely aggressive approach at the plate, putting the ball in play more often than other teams; as such, their overall performance is more tightly tied to their overall batting average than most. Joe Sheehan of Baseball Prospectus (they're going to come up a lot) had a useful insight into this approach: since batting average displays more year-to-year variance than secondary batting skills, one would expect the performance of the Angels offense to display such variance. The Angels take a high risk, high reward approach to hitting; some years, the
schtick works, other times it doesn't (Sorry, I lied about the links.) In other words, the Angels have just had a lot of their batted balls fall in for hits this year; next year, they may not.

I still haven't touched on the Angel's baserunning, which is the part of their game about which crusty old men who wish it were still the 60's most like to wax lyrical. How much of an effect does their running game have? As Jack points out, they only steal bases at a 73% success rate; given that the break-even stolen base rate in the current offensive environment is about 72%, it is unlikely they are adding many runs this way.

There is more to baserunning than stealing bases; more important are features that were sadly not recorded until recently, namely, advancing on outs and taking the extra base on hits. And the Angels are spectacularly good at that sort of baserunning, far better than any other team in baseball. In a series of articles last year on Baseball Prospectus, Dan Fox carried out an exhaustive study of baserunning. Fox estimated that the Angels added about 20 runs last year in non-stolen base baserunning (though they gave up about 8 runs by getting thrown out so often stealing); no other team was above 8. 20 runs is a lot, worth about 2 wins in the standings. Thus, assuming their baserunning this year is comparable to last year (which is a big assumption), we would expect them to have scored about 20 runs more than expected. This assumption is roughly borne out: using Bill James's simplest runs created formula (AB*OBP*SLG) the Angles should have scored 732 runs this year when in fact they have scored 761. I know, 29 is not the same as 20, but given the coarse nature of baseball statistics this seems pretty good to me.

Of course, having just said all that, the Angels were just shut out by the Orioles with Jon Leicester on the mound, so maybe they just suck.

By the way, I nominate this for dumbest thing ever. Unless the guy is a Sox fan.

Why are the Angels so good?

The Angels' team ERA, 4.19, is 12th in baseball. They are fifth in on-base percentage, .346, and runs scored, 761.

Why do the Angels have the second-best record? Even their expected record (based on runs scored and runs allowed), while worse than their actual record, is third best.

Thomas Boswell credits manager Mike Scioscia's strategy of aggression on the basepaths. Boswell's argument isn't satisfying. The Angels are 18th--below the MLB median--in stolen base percentage (73%). They just run more, leading the majors in stolen bases and caught stealing alike. The Angels' stolen base percentage is low enough that, if conventional wisdom of statistics experts is right, running more often shouldn't much help, and if anything should hurt.

The only way to save the Scioscia strategy, as far as I see, is to argue for psychological effects. Constant baserunning keeps other teams on their toes all game long. Yet psychological effects haven't flummoxed opposing catchers, who throw out Angels' runners at above-average rates. In fact, considered in the abstract, psychological effects might just as well hurt the Angels because opposing outfielders will know from the crack of the bat to come up throwing.

Other ideas?

Julio Lugo, nut

Welcome to Primarily Baseball.

I quote:


Lugo fondly recalled a magical moment when the team flew over the international date late in the Pacific Ocean.


“I was (video)taping out the window and it was one of the most impressive things I’ve seen in my entire life,” he said. “We were flying across it and, I swear, it was completely day time and then in 30 seconds, it was completely dark. It was incredible. I’ll never forget it.”

Now that, well, didn't happen. Julio Lugo either is cleverly duping the Boston Herald reporter or had assumed that being airborne somehow lifts the illegality of certain substances. Which is it? According to Wikipedia,

Lugo has received controversy in the Boston media regarding incessant crotch grabbing during games....It's even been suggested that local Red Sox network NESN attempts to only show him from above the waist to avoid TV embarrassment.

In short, Julio Lugo would be awesome, if only he could hit.